Enforcing Judgments Across State and National Boundaries: Inbound Foreign Judgments and Outbound Texas Judgments by George, James P.
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
3-2009 
Enforcing Judgments Across State and National Boundaries: 
Inbound Foreign Judgments and Outbound Texas Judgments 
James P. George 
Texas A&M University School of Law, pgeorge@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James P. George, Enforcing Judgments Across State and National Boundaries: Inbound Foreign 
Judgments and Outbound Texas Judgments, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 399 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/243 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
ENFORCING JUDGMENTS ACROSS STATE AND
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: INBOUND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS AND OUTBOUND TEXAS
JUDGMENTS
JAMES P. GEORGE*
I. INTERSTATE JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT ................................ 402
A. The Constitutional Template-Full Faith and Credit
Tempered by D ue Process ................................................... 402
1. The Full-Faith-and-Credit Enforcement Mandate ....... 403
a. The Constitutional Mandate and Its Scope ........... 403
b. Statutory Full Faith and Credit ............................... 404
2. Due Process-Defenses to the Full-Faith-and-Credit
M andate ........................................................................... 406
a. Successful D efenses .................................................. 406
b. U nsuccessful D efenses ............................................. 410
3. More Due Process-Supreme Court Review ............... 411
B. Texas Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments .................... 412
1. Texas Enforcement Under the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ....................... 413
a. G overning Law .......................................................... 414
b. Specific Filing Requirements ................................... 415
c. D efenses ..................................................................... 418
d. Burdens and Presumptions ...................................... 420
2. Common Law Enforcement .......................................... 421
C. Outbound Texas Judgments-Enforcing Texas
Judgm ents in Sister States ..................................................... 422
1. Enforcement in States Following the UEFJA ............... 422
2. Enforcement in Non-UEFJA States .............................. 422
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University; Of Counsel, Whitaker Chalk
Swindle & Sawyer, L.L.P., Fort Worth, Texas; B.A., Oklahoma State University; J.D.,
University of Tulsa; LL.M., Columbia University. Member, American Law Institute;
Director, American Society of Comparative Law. The author thanks Professor Anna
Teller and third-year law student Tracy Stearns-Bush for their assistance.
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
D . Federal C ourts ....................................................................... 423
II. INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT ........................ 424
A. The International Mosaic ..................................................... 424
1. Treaties ............................................................................. 424
2. The United States View of Foreign-Country
Judgm ents ........................................................................ 426
3. Foreign Judgment Enforcement in Other Countries .... 427
B. Inbound Foreign-Country Judgments in Texas Courts ..... 429
1. The Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgment Recognition Act ............................................. 429
a. Enforcement Mandate ............................................. 429
b. A uthentication .......................................................... 430
c. F iling ........................................................................... 432
d. Jurisdiction and Venue ............................................. 432
e. Stays ............................................................................ 432
f. D efenses ..................................................................... 432
g. Full Faith and Credit for Foreign Country
Judgment Denials ..................................................... 435
h. Burdens and Presumptions ...................................... 435
i. Proof of Foreign Law ............................................... 435
j. A ppeal ........................................................................ 436
2. Common Law Enforcement of Foreign-Country
Judgm ents ........................................................................ 437
3. Treaties ............................................................................. 437
a. Treaties on Judgment Enforcement ....................... 437
b. Other Treaties Affecting Judgment
E nforcem ent .............................................................. 438
4. Foreign Arbitral Awards ................................................ 438
a. Against Private Parties ............................................. 438
b. Against Foreign Sovereigns ..................................... 439
5. Federal Courts ................................................................. 440
6. Converting Foreign Monetary Judgments .................... 441
7. Non-Monetary Judgments .............................................. 442
a. In Rem Judgments .................................................... 442
b. Status Judgments ...................................................... 442
c. Injunctions ................................................................. 443
C. Enforcing Texas Judgments in Other Countries ................ 443
1. Examine Domestic Enforcement Opportunities .......... 444
2. Enforcing Court Judgments Abroad ............................. 444
a. Prerequisites-Planning for Enforcement in F-2.. 444
b. Prerequisites-Preparing the Texas Judgment ..... 445
c. Filing and Notice ....................................................... 446
d. Miscellaneous Requirements ................................... 446
e. D efenses ..................................................................... 446
3. Enforcing Arbitration Awards ....................................... 447
[Vol. 50:399
ENFORCING JUDGMENTS
Litigation between parties in different states has been common
since the success of the railroads and telegraph in the late nineteenth
century. International litigation-suits involving parties from different
countries-is now routine. In spite of that routine, lawyers continue to
face enforcement obstacles when suing a defendant from another
state or country. Similarly, defendants perceive unfairness from
judgments rendered far away. Those enforcement obstacles and
instances of unfairness have been lessened by uniform enforcement
statutes and a few treaties, but the rules remain elusive.
This Article provides a cursory outline for most foreign-judgment
enforcement issues that Texas attorneys will face. It focuses primarily
on the collection of money damages from judgments in civil cases
between private litigants, and briefly addresses the extraterritorial
enforcement of divorce, custody, other status decrees, child support
awards, injunctions, and in rem claims. The Article is divided into two
larger sections for interstate and international enforcement, and each
of those in turn is divided into incoming foreign judgments and
outgoing Texas judgments. Texas law predominates the state-law
discussion, but other states' case law and secondary sources provide
additional authority on points not yet litigated in Texas. For interstate
judgment enforcement, these other sources should be highly
persuasive because of their reference to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the uniform enforcement statutes. For international
judgment enforcement, there is somewhat less state-to-state
similarity. Legal discussions spanning states and nations must deal
with a number of components, and the four most common are
reduced to acronyms:
F-1 refers to the court, state or nation rendering the initial
decision to be enforced.
F-2 refers to the court, state or nation in which enforcement is
sought.
UEFJA refers to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act either in the model form' or the Texas version,' as
indicated.
UFCMJRA refers to the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act either in the model form3 or the Texas
version,' as indicated.
1. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (amended 1964), 13 pt. I
U.L.A. 160 (2002); UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (1948), 13 pt I
U.L.A. 248 (2002).
2. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 2008).
3. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (amended
2009]
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I. INTERSTATE JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
This first Part on interstate enforcement deals broadly with
judgments from jurisdictions within the United States-states,
territories, and its federal system. This Part addresses enforcement
between all those jurisdictions in the United States, including state-to-
state, state-to-federal, federal-to-state, intrafederal, and includes
United States territories and possessions. Legal sources include
constitutional law, uniform statutes and common law.
Judgment enforcement within the United States requires a
coordination of two competing constitutional doctrines-full faith and
credit, sometimes opposed by due process-with the substantive and
procedural law from two states. These multiple legal sources result in
sometimes confounding choice-of-law problems regarding which rule
applies in which setting. This Article attempts to clear that up.
Texas has two enforcement procedures-statutory and common
law. Neither of them can be understood without first understanding
full faith and credit. Texas law merely provides a procedure for filing,
objecting, and collecting, but does not provide the requirements for
judgment recognition and, perhaps more importantly, the defenses.
The enforcing state's law governs filing the foreign judgment, but if
there is any contest, the principles in this Part will determine the
outcome.
A. The Constitutional Template-Full Faith and Credit Tempered by
Due Process
Two constitutional principles provide the starting point for
judgment enforcement within the United States. The first is the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which requires all courts in the United States
to honor valid and final judgments from all other domestic courts.5
This is offset by the Due Process Clause, which protects defendants
from judgments lacking primary safeguards.6 Full faith and credit is
2005), 13 pt 1I U.L.A. 5-20 (Supp. 2008); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT (1962) 13 pt. II U.L.A. 39-80 (2002).
4. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008.
5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS ch. 24 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing interstate recognition of judgments); RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 11 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing
full faith and credit of judgments).
6. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Due process also plays a role as the basis for
objections to F-1 amenability and notice. See infra note 34. Further, due process provides a
fair trial objection to certain foreign-country judgments. See infra notes 182-84.
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the enforcement mandate; due process provides the basis for most of
the defenses.
1. The Full-Faith-and-Credit Enforcement Mandate
The English and European concepts of claim preclusion and
conflict of laws promoted the idea that once parties had litigated a
claim in a proper court with basic procedural fairness, the resulting
judgment should be final and not subject to relitigation. Those
concepts alone would have been enough to encourage judgment
recognition between the states. But the Constitution's drafters wanted
more assurance that interstate judgment recognition would not be left
to the whims of state courts applying common law claim preclusion, so
they created a constitutional doctrine underscoring that obligation.7
Among the other constitutional doctrines defining federalism, it
stands alone as the only one not supporting an independent claim of
federal question jurisdiction.8
a. The Constitutional Mandate and Its Scope
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is short and direct but has
required a fair bit of judicial interpretation as explained below. It
requires that:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and
the Effect thereof.9
The Full Faith and Credit Clause refers only to judicial
proceedings and does not have an express finality requirement. That
is, states must give full faith and credit to all judicial proceedings,
including interlocutory holdings. This phrasing is repeated in the
primary full faith and credit statute-28 U.S.C. § 1738. Case law has
nonetheless read in a finality requirement. °
7. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at
873-74 (2d Sess. 2004).
8. See Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (4th ed. 2005).
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Maner v. Maner, 412 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1969); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (1971); SCOLES ET AL., supra note
5, § 24.8 & n.4.
2009]
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Full faith and credit applies to valid and final in personam
judgments rendered in American courts. It applies to both legal and
equitable decisions" but generally does not apply to in rem judgments
for real property, which are not mentioned in the Uniform Act."
Personal property judgments and status determinations are generally
entitled to full faith and credit. 3 Full faith and credit also governs
interstate preclusion, which is the basis for judgment enforcement
(even under the Uniform Acts) and for the defenses. In turn, state
and federal case law applying full faith and credit in preclusion
matters are authority for judgment enforcement as well. Full faith and
credit also requires interstate preclusion, discussed further in the
common law enforcement section. 4
b. Statutory Full Faith and Credit
The Full Faith and Credit Clause required statutory
implementation which promptly occurred in 1790." Congress has
added several corollary statutes since that time to address specific
points, 6 but the basic interstate judgment-enforcement function flows
11. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998).
12. Judgments regarding title to real property have no interstate effect, for two
reasons-if the land is located in F-i, there will be no need to enforce it elsewhere, and F-1
lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to land elsewhere. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1
(1909) (holding that Nebraska is not required to recognize Washington state divorce
court's determination of land title in Nebraska); McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722
(Tex. 1961); cf Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). This is further explained by the
exception to full faith and credit, which does not require recognition of an F-1 judgment
adjudicating something over which F-2 had exclusive control. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235;
Robbins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 102 S.W.3d 739, 743-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 30 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Belcher Co. of Ala. v. M/V Maratha Mariner, 724 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1984) (enforcing quasi in rem judgment); In re Chase, 141 S.E. 471 (N.C. 1928) (enforcing
Florida incompetence determination); Knowles v. Grimes, 437 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1969)
(child custody); see infra note 16. For further discussion of in rem claims, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 56-65 (1971 & Supp. 1989), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 30 (1982). For status adjudications, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 69-79 (1971 & Supp. 1989), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31 (1982). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97 (1971) (invoking res judicata as to jurisdiction over in rem and
status adjudications).
14. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
15. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (1790) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2006)).
16. Other full-faith-and-credit statutes include: 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006) (child
custody determinations); id. § 1738B (child support orders); id. § 1738C (exempting same-
sex marriages from full faith and credit); id. § 1739 (nonjudicial records).
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from the primary statute-28 U.S.C. § 1738-the successor to the
original 1790 act.
Section 1738 serves two functions-the authentication of sister-
state statutes, and the authentication of records and judicial
proceedings from sister-state courts. Both are given full faith and
credit, but that given to statutes has merely an evidentiary effect while
that given to judgments has a preclusive and pre-emptive effect. The
statute's literal language imposes a judgment enforcement mandate
on "every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions,"'" necessarily including enforcements performed state-to-
state, between states and United States territories, state-to-federal,8
and federal-to-state.19 Section 1738's inclusion of federal and
territorial courts exceeds the Constitution's language but has been
held constitutional." Decades of statutory interpretation of section
1738 has clarified three requirements:
(1) Authentication: Section 1738 provides for proof from the F-1
court, with originals or copies; the F-1 clerk's attestation and court
seal, if a seal exists; and the F-1 judge's certificate that the attestation
is in proper form.' Many courts go further and provide an
exemplification procedure involving triple certification, with the clerk
attesting to the judgment's authenticity, the judge affirming the clerk's
status and authority, and the clerk affirming the judge's status and
authority.'
(2) Reduction to local judgment: In spite of the intended ease of
interstate judgment enforcement under full faith and credit, federal
law since 1839 has required the judgment creditor to reduce the F-1
judgment to a local judgment in F-2 in order to enforce it, 3 as further
reflected in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.24
(3) Reception by the receiving court: Once a final and properly
authenticated F-1 judgment has been filed in the F-2 court, it is
entitled to full faith and credit in every state and territory in the
17. Id. § 1738.
18. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468, 471 (1982).
19. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938).
20. See Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Harbison-Fischer Mfg. Co. v. Mohawk Data Scis. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 679,
684-85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991), writ granted w.r.m., 840 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1992)
(illustrating New York's use of the same procedure).
23. See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 329-30 (1839).
24. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2 (amended 1964), 13
pt. I U.L.A. 163 (2002); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon
2008).
2009]
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United States, with the same effect in F-2 states as the judgment
would have under F-1 law or usage.2
2. Due Process-Defenses to the Full-Faith-and-Credit Mandate
The full-faith-and-credit enforcement mandate has due process
limitations. Most defenses must be raised in F-1 prior to final
judgment, or on appeal, or as a later collateral attack in F-. 26 But a
few defenses may be raised in F-2, some based on due process and
some based on failing to qualify for full faith and credit.
a. Successful Defenses
(1) Nonfinal judgment: Only final judgments are entitled to
recognition and enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 7
The F-2 court may only enforce the amount that was reduced to
judgment by the F-1 court.' Finality is controlled by F-1 law.29 The
most recent final judgment is the one entitled to recognition and
enforcement. °
(2) Judgment not on the merits: A final F-1 judgment rendered on
some grounds other than the merits is not entitled to full faith and
credit." This should never be an issue in judgment enforcement, which
presumably rests on a final judgment on the merits awarding money
or other relief to the F-1 plaintiff. It could, however, raise defensive
issues in F-2 where prior litigation may bar enforcement. 2
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
26. For examples of F-1 defenses, see infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
27. See Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1992);
Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1998, no pet.); Myers v. Ribble, 796 S.W.2d 222, 223-25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
no writ) (holding Florida divorce decree not final and not enforceable); cf. Markham v.
Diversified Land & Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998,
pet. denied) (ruling California default judgment using the singular term "defendant" when
there were two defendants did not defeat finality for full faith and credit purposes).
28. See Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1901) (holding F-l's award of future
alimony unenforceable in F-2); see also Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86 (1944).
29. See Barber, 323 U.S. at 79-83; Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 209
(1933).
30. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 107, 108, 109, 111 (1971) (non-finality generally,
indeterminate monetary award in F-i, modifiable judgment, and conditional judgment;
respectively).
31. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 282 (1980) (plurality opinion);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 186 (1947).
32. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111; SCOLES
ET AL., supra note 5, § 24.4 (discussing foreign judgments not on the merits).
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(3) Invalid F-1 judgment: The F-2 court may reject the F-1
judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,33 lack of personal
jurisdiction (either amenability or notice) 3' or other invalidating
grounds such as fraud,35 as long as those issues were not litigated in F-
1.36 Defendants who neither argued nor waived their jurisdictional
objections in F-1 (as in a default judgment) may object in F-2 and, on
the issue of personal jurisdiction, may object in F-2 to both
amenability and service of process in F-1.37
33. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62 (1938); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S.
411,414 (1920); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105.
34. See Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.)
(denying enforcement of Kansas default judgment against Texas defendants). The bulk of
jurisdictional precedents make the point of review for personal jurisdiction in F-i,
nonetheless finding jurisdiction and upholding the F-1 judgment. See H. Heller & Co. v.
La.-Pac. Corp., 209 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)
(holding that Alabama had personal jurisdiction over judgment debtor); Boyes v. Morris
Polich & Purdy, LLP, 169 S.W.3d 448, 454 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.); Maxfield v.
Terry, 885 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (upholding Florida
appointment of administrator in probate case); Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 782
S.W.2d 339, 340 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (stating New York had personal
jurisdiction over Texas defendant); First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding Texas residents subject to Montana's long-
arm statute for a bank loan in Montana used for land purchased in Montana).
35. Fraud can invalidate a sister-state judgment, but case law distinguishes between
extrinsic fraud (bribery and other matters going to basic fairness in the case) and intrinsic
fraud (ordinary fraud such as perjury or forged documents offered as evidence in the case).
Extrinsic fraud is grounds for nonrecognition, as is intrinsic fraud that prevented a fair trial
(for example, where plaintiff had no chance to object in the F-1 trial). Intrinsic fraud to
which plaintiff objected, or could have objected, or which did not otherwise prevent a fair
trial, may not be grounds for nonrecognition. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348-52
(1948); Treinies, 308 U.S. at 77; see generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, § 24.17. Texas
subscribes to this distinction. E.g., Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc.,
132 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2004, pet. denied) (finding faulty
certificate of service of process did not amount to extrinsic fraud where defendant could
have raised the issue in the F-1 trial); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
70 (1982).
36. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1931)
(stating personal jurisdiction challenge to F-1 forum, once litigated and lost in F-i, may not
be relitigated in F-2).
37. See Saenger, 303 U.S. at 61-62, 67-68; see also Markham v. Diversified Land &
Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Mayfield v.
Dean Witter Fin. Servs., Inc., 894 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104. In Saenger, the Court explained
that jurisdiction was not litigated in F-i and the Texas court rejected the F-1 judgment for
improper service of process on a corporate defendant, improper under both F-1 law and
the U.S. Constitution; the Court reversed on both grounds because the Texas court
incorrectly interpreted F-1 law and federal law. Saenger, 303 U.S. at 61-62, 67-68.
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
(4) Nature of the F-i claim: Courts in the United States are not
required to enforce penal judgments from sister states and may also
reject certain procedural matters.
(a) Penal judgments: Full faith and credit does not require F-2
to enforce penal laws of F-i, but the Supreme Court may review
whether the F-1 judgment was penal. In Huntington v. Attrill, a
Maryland court erred in characterizing as penal a New York law
which made corporate officers liable for signing and recording a false
certificate of the amount of its capital stock. Its intent was civil and
not criminal. Full faith and credit therefore required the recognition
of the resulting New York judgment in Maryland. 8
(b) Inter-jurisdictional injunctions: A Missouri federal court was
not required to enforce a Michigan state court injunction regarding a
former employee not testifying against General Motors in a Missouri
action brought by a person who was not a party in the Michigan case.39
But, note that injunctions against the F-2 enforcement of an
inconsistent judgment may be entitled to recognition under full faith
and credit.'
(c) In rem judgments: Full faith and credit does not apply to F-
l's adjudication of title to real property in F-2 which is closely
related to, or a subset of the following category.
(d) Judgments interfering with F-2's exclusive interests (in rem
and other matters): In Baker v. General Motors, the Supreme Court
denied enforcement of a Michigan injunction attempting to stop
defendant's employee from testifying in a Missouri lawsuit. The
rejection was based not only on full faith and credit's inapplicability to
interstate injunctions but also on the impropriety of interfering with
ongoing adjudication in F-2. Note that this is not a public policy
exception, but the inapplicability of full faith and credit to an F-1
judgment regulating something within F-2's exclusive control. 2 These
38. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 686 (1892); cf. EnviroPower, L.L.C. v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 265 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet. h.)
(holding New York judgment based on death penalty sanction was not a penal judgment
and was entitled to enforcement).
39. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 240-41 (1998); Robbins v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 102 S.W.3d 739, 743-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); see
also WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, § 11.1.
40. See, e.g., First Tenn. Bank N.A. Memphis v. Smith, 766 F.2d 255, 260 (6th Cir.
1985); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 113-14; SCOLES ET AL.,supra note 5, § 24.29.
41. See McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722, 733 (Tex. 1961) (explaining that full
faith and credit does not apply to sister state's adjudication of title to real property in
Texas).
42. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41 (denying enforcement of Michigan injunction
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defenses fall into two categories-interference with matters over
which F-2 has exclusive control 3 and interference with important F-2
interests." These two defenses are exceptions to the general rule that
F-2's public policy cannot block enforcement of the F-1 judgment. 5
(e) Stale judgments (on which the enforcement time has lapsed)
may or may not be enforceable under the following criteria. Under
Texas law, a judgment that is stale under F-1 law is not enforceable in
Texas,46 even though the Constitution permits F-2 to apply its own law
and extend the enforcement period.4 '7 Texas law further bars
enforcement of a sister-state judgment more than ten years old
against a person who has resided in Texas for more than ten years.48 In
addition, a judgment stale in F-2 may be denied enforcement in F-2 if
the F-2 limitation period applies equally to domestic and foreign
judgments. 9
(5) Matters subsequent to the original F-1 judgment can provide
defenses to F-2 enforcement. These include satisfaction," subsequent
attempting to stop defendant's employee from testifying in a Missouri lawsuit); Pac.
Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501-02 (1939); Robbins, 102
S.W.3d at 743-45.
43. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41 (denying enforcement of Michigan injunction
attempting to stop defendant's employee from testifying in a Missouri lawsuit); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945) (denying recognition of Nevada divorce decree in
prosecution for bigamy); Robbins, 102 S.W.3d at 743-45; see also Williams v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270, 272 (S.D. Ga. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 117. A more recent example is Congress's 1996 law exempting same-sex marriages
from the full faith and credit mandate. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99,
110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
44. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702,
715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (holding Texas not required to
enforce a Louisiana judgment which itself was merely a recognition of a Canadian
judgment, which should have been brought under the Texas UFCMJRA); see also
Williams, 325 U.S. at 238 (denying recognition of Nevada divorce decree in prosecution for
bigamy).
45. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
46. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066(a) (Vernon 2008).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 118(2); see also Watkins
v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 189-90 (1966) (per curiam). This rule goes so far as to require
that judgments gone stale in F-i, then revived under F-2's longer judgment enforcement
period, must be honored if brought back to F-1 for enforcement there. Watkins, 385 U.S. at
189-90; see also Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 455 (1928).
48. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066(b).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 118 cmt. c. See generally
Lawrence Sys., Inc., v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994,
writ denied) (barring enforcement of judgment as either a domestic or foreign judgment).
50. Satisfaction includes payment, discharge, or other performance of the obligation
or judgment. See Ankrom v. Ankrom, 531 A.2d 509, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 116. F-1 law governs satisfaction, and
if full satisfaction is required to discharge joint tortfeasors, then partial payment will not be
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judgments," reversal or other contrary action as to prior judgment,52
set-offs,53 and equitable relief or collateral attack if available in F-i,
usually based on fraud. 4
b. Unsuccessful Defenses
(1) Erroneous judgment: Judicial errors in F-1 are not
objectionable in F-2, whether the errors were raised in F-1 or not.
Once the judgment there is final, full faith and credit requires F-2 to
enforce it as rendered in F-l 5  Similarly, judgment irregularities which
could have been raised in F-1 are not defenses in F-2. 6
(2) Original action not litigable in F-2: In Kenney v. Supreme
Lodge, Illinois law did not permit litigation of wrongful death actions
arising outside of Illinois and relied on that law to refuse enforcement
of an Alabama judgment for wrongful death. The Supreme Court
reversed and held that Illinois must enforce a valid and final sister
sufficient (that is, F-1 law controls the effect of satisfaction and discharge in F-2). See
Signal Data Processing, Inc. v. Rex Humbard Found., 651 N.E.2d 498, 500-01 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994); Burkett v. McCaw, 515 P.2d 988, 990-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). Contra Meyer
v. First Am. Title Ins. Agency of Mohave, Inc., 674 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
51. Subsequent-judgment defenses are based on the effect under F-1 law, although
the last-in-time rule can twist this result for conflicting interstate judgments. The last-in-
time rule holds that under full faith and credit, the enforcing court must give effect to the
last judgment rendered. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1939). In
Treinies, the party should have appealed F-2 court's failure to recognize F-1 judgment;
once the F-2 judgment was final, it trumped the F-1 judgment and became the operative
judgment for the F-3 court. See also Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. A.E. Rouse & Co., 121
F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997); First Tenn. Bank N.A. Memphis v. Smith, 766 F.2d 255,
259 (6th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114.
52. See Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 112, 113, 121 (vacated judgment, permanently enjoined
enforcement, and reversal; respectively); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 16. Note that these defenses are based on the effect under F-1 law.
53. Set-offs may be assertable in F-2 to the extent they are permitted under F-2 law
and not barred for failure to assert in the F-1 action (as compulsory counterclaims would
be). There is no case law on this point, although several cases bar counterclaims for various
reasons. E.g., Hammette v. Eickemeyer, 416 S.E.2d 824, 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Pavey
Envelope & Tag Corp. v. Diamond Envelope Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (I11. App. Ct.
1995); Landon v. Artz, 631 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Concannon v. Hampton,
584 P.2d 218, 222 (Okla. 1978).
54. E.g., Browning v. Navarro, 826 F.2d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 1987). For fraud grounds,
see supra note 35. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115.
55. See In re Brady, Tex., Mun. Gas Corp., 936 F.2d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 1991); Russo v.
Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46-47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
56. See Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 658 (Colo. 1991) (en banc);
Cantwell Mach. Co. v. Ballard Agency, Inc., 583 So. 2d 73, 78 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding 1989 F-1 judgment erroneously dated 1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106.
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state judgment, even though that action could not have been brought
in an Illinois court.57 Thus, F-2's failure to recognize the original claim,
or F-2's lack of a court capable of hearing the claim, is not grounds to
refuse full faith and credit.
(3) Illegality in F-2: A sister-state judgment on a matter illegal in
F-2 may nonetheless be entitled to enforcement under full faith and
credit. Fauntleroy v. Lum involved a Missouri judgment on a contract
for speculation in cotton futures in Mississippi. The contract was
illegal in Mississippi but had been arbitrated and reduced to judgment
in Missouri. Plaintiff's attempt to enforce the Missouri judgment in
Mississippi was initially denied because the Mississippi statute was
deemed to deny jurisdiction for any action on a futures contract. The
Supreme Court reversed under full faith and credit and required the
Mississippi court to provide a forum to enforce the Missouri
judgment. 8
(4) Public policy in F-2: An F-1 judgment contrary to F-2's public
policy is generally not a defense to full faith and credit,59 subject to
two related exceptions where the F-1 judgment interferes with F-2's
important interests or matters within F-2's exclusive control.
6
0
(5) Equitable decision from F-i: Equity decrees are entitled to
full faith and credit unless circumstances dictate otherwise.61
3. More Due Process-Supreme Court Review
The receiving state does not have the final say. Full faith and
credit creates a federal question of interstate enforcement, and every
aspect of F-2's treatment of the F-1 judgment is reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The leading case-Adam v. Saenger62-is a Texas
court's rejection of a California judgment on jurisdictional grounds.
The Supreme Court's ruling clarified both the breadth and depth of
full faith and credit.
57. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1920); see also Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-37 (1908).
58. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 238; see also GNLV Corp. v. Jackson, 736 S.W.2d 893, 894
(Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied) (enforcing Nevada gambling debts judgment
pursuant to full faith and credit).
59. See Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. 1992);
Knighton v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, writ denied).
60. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
61. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1998).
62. 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
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Texas-based Beaumont Export & Import Company initially filed
an action in California Superior Court against Montes and others as
trustees of a dissolved California corporation. Saenger
counterclaimed in the California court for chattel conversion and
served notice on Beaumont E & I's attorney there, consistent with
California practice. Beaumont E & I failed to prosecute its original
claim and lost by default on the counterclaim, resulting in a dismissal
of the primary claim and judgment on the counterclaim.6 3
Saenger, as Montes's successor in interest, brought the
California judgment to Texas for enforcement. The Texas trial court
dismissed the California judgment for lack of jurisdiction, based in
part on the Texas court's construction of California law for service of
the counterclaim. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed and the Texas
Supreme Court denied review. The Texas decisions posed yet another
jurisdictional question for the United States Supreme Court---could it
review the Texas determination of California law, which at that time
was considered a question of fact. The Court first noted that Texas (or
F-2) courts had every right to review a question of California (or F-i)
jurisdiction as long as that issue had not been raised in California. But
the F-2 decision was reviewable by the Supreme Court without regard
to Texas law characterizing its actions as questions of fact, based on
the obvious constitutional implications. ' The Court went on to
conclude that the Texas courts had erred in construing California law
regarding service of the counterclaim on Beaumont E & I's attorney
and remanded with orders to honor the California judgment.65
B. Texas Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments
As explained in the preceding subpart, full faith and credit
compels states to enforce final judgments from other United States
jurisdictions. From the Supreme Court's first interstate judgment
enforcement in 179466 until the mid-twentieth century, the procedure
was for the judgment creditor to file a new lawsuit in F-2, using the F-
1 judgment as grounds for summary judgment based on claim
preclusion. The result is a new F-2 judgment with the same status as
the judgment would have in F-1. This result necessarily flows from the
language of the full-faith-and-credit statute.6' Beyond the
63. Id. at 60-61.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id. at 64-68.
66. See Armstrong v. Carson's Ex'rs, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 302 (1794).
67. "Such... judicial proceedings... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
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fundamentals of full-faith-and-credit enforcement, each state had its
own procedures for F-2 enforcement, necessarily consistent with full
faith and credit but varying according to local discretion on execution
and other matters as explained below.
In spite of procedural variations, the common law method was no
doubt similar among the states. The proceeding was largely a
formality, except in those cases where the judgment debtor raised
fact-intensive objections to enforcement. The pro forma nature of F-2
enforcement led to the 1948 creation of the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act.6' As with other uniform acts, states will vary
on provisions. 69 Texas adopted the UEFJA in 19850 and retains
common law enforcement,7 and each is explained below.
1. Texas Enforcement Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act
The Texas UEFJA requires the judgment creditor to file a copy
of the judgment authenticated under federal or Texas law" and that
notice be given to the judgment debtor by the clerk 73 or by the
judgment creditor. 4 The judgment debtor may move to stay
enforcement under either the law of Texas or the rendering state;
75
although, state law cannot supersede full faith and credit. The
judgment-debtor may also challenge enforcement under traditional
full faith and credit grounds such as the rendering state's lack of
personal or subject matter jurisdiction.7 6
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
68. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS Acr (amended 1964), 13 pt. I
U.L.A. 155-245 (2002).
69. For state variations as to each section of the UEFJA, see the statutory notes
found in UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 1-10 (amended 1964),
13 pt. I U.L.A. 155-245 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
70. Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3274-
75 (current version at TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 35.001-008 (Vernon 2008)).
71. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2008); see also
Brown's Inc. v. Modern Welding Co., 54 S.W.3d 450,453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.).
72. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003.
73. Id. § 35.004.
74. Id. § 35.005.
75. Id. § 35.006.
76. Id. § 35.003.
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a. Governing Law
In filing the foreign judgment, it is important to distinguish
between the issues governed by Texas law and those governed by the
F-1 state. The rendering state's law governs judgment finality,'
judgment validity (that is, the F-1 court's subject matter jurisdiction),78
personal jurisdiction for the original judgment (subject to
constitutional limits),79 the availability of post-judgment collateral
attacks,8° and the effect of reversal, vacating, or collateral attacks.81 It
is axiomatic that the F-1 final judgment, if otherwise valid, is the last
word on the merits.8
Texas (or F-2) law governs filing procedures, authentication
(along with federal law), notice of the enforcement action (subject to
constitutional requirements), methods of enforcement (including the
availability of injunctions), local fees, stays of the F-2 enforcement
action, venue of the enforcement action, and other miscellaneous
enforcement procedures. 83 Federal law governs authentication (along
with Texas or F-2 law), 8' defenses under full faith and credit (along
with F-1 law's determination of finality, etc.), and limits on full faith
and credit.85
77. See Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 487-88
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that Georgia law governed
finality); Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.) (holding
that the finality of Ohio judgment was governed by that state's law and not Texas law).
78. See Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex. 1992);
Gen. Exploration Co. v. David, 596 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston flst Dist.]
1979, writ dism'd).
79. "A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a sister state by demonstrating
that (1) service of process was inadequate under the rules of the sister state or (2) the sister
state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction offends the due process of law." Markham v.
Diversified Land & Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet.
denied); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); supra note 34.
80. See Markham, 973 S.W.2d at 439 (holding a bill of review attacking the merits of
California judgment unavailable in Texas enforcement action).
81. See Moody v. State, 547 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam).
82. See Trinity Capital Corp. v. Briones, 847 S.W.2d 324, 326-27 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1993, no writ) (holding that a motion for new trial merely permits objections under the
UEFJA and does not re-open the case on the merits).
83. See Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 485
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Urso v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 93
S.W.3d 276, 278-80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (explaining Texas
appellate timetables applied to appeals from foreign judgment enforcement); Gen.
Exploration, 596 S.W.2d at 146.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006), discussed infra at notes 88-91 and accompanying
text.
85. See supra Part I.A.2.
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Ordinarily F-1 law will not be an issue unless the judgment
debtor challenges the filing. If F-1 law becomes an issue, the party
raising the issue (likely the judgment debtor) has the burden of
pleading and proving the content of the pertinent F-1 law. Under
Texas law, judicial notice governs the pleading and proof of the F-1
law, requiring "sufficient information." In spite of the seemingly easy
judicial notice rule, the proffering party should plead the content of F-
1 law in the objection, provide clear photocopies to the court and all
parties, and allow ample time for response. If the proffering party fails
to prove F-1 law, then F-1 law is presumed to be identical to F-2's law,
and that presumption has applied Texas law to determine legal results
from other statesY Presumptions aside, to the extent that F-1 law
favors the opposing party (likely the judgment creditor), that party
may want to prove its content as well.
b. Specific Filing Requirements
(1) Authentication: Texas requires authentication under either an
act of Congress or a Texas statute.Y Federal law establishes the
maximum standard which states may not exceed, spelled out in the
full faith and credit statute:
[B]y the attestation of the [F-1 court] clerk and seal of the [F-i]
court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a
judge of the [F-i] court that the said attestation is in proper
form.8
86.
A court upon its own motion may, or upon the motion of a party shall,
take judicial notice of the constitutions, public statutes, rules, regulations,
ordinances, court decisions, and common law of every other state, territory,
or jurisdiction of the United States. A party requesting that judicial notice
be taken of such matter shall furnish the court sufficient information to
enable it properly to comply with the request, and shall give all parties such
notice, if any, as the court may deem necessary, to enable all parties fairly to
prepare to meet the request. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. Judicial notice of such
matters may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. The court's
determination shall be subject to review as a ruling on a question of law.
TEX. R. EVID. 202.
87. See Charles Brown, L.L.P. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 883, 894 n.20
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
88. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 2008).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
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Texas law has similar requirements governing self-authentication
of documents from jurisdictions within the United States.9° The
document filed must be a properly-authenticated copy of the foreign
judgment and not merely the F-1 state's abstract of judgment or some
other evidence of the judgment. 9
In spite of the minor variation in these federal and state
authentication requirements, the widely-accepted form is commonly
known as exemplification, or colloquially as "triple-certification."
Although there is apparently no rule defining it, exemplification is the
court clerk's certification of the judgment's authenticity, in addition to
the judge's statement that the person signing as clerk has authority to
do so, and the clerk's statement that the person signing as judge has
authority to do so. It is also apparent, again without guiding authority,
that deputy clerks may sign for the district clerk and the judge may be
the judge who rendered the decision, the presiding administrative
judge in that district, or perhaps any judge in that district.'
Exemplification's three-way attestation may exceed federal
authentication requirements under § 1738, but its wide acceptance is a
good reason to obtain it whenever possible. Judgment creditors
should bear in mind that the authentication will occur in F-1 but must
be accepted in F-2. Although appeal is proper when the F-2 court
rejects an F-1 judgment that meets minimal authentication standards,
it is better to avoid appeal by obtaining a triple-certified judgment
from the F-1 clerk.
(2) Filing: With the F-1 judgment properly-authenticated, the
judgment creditor then files it in an F-2 court, in this case, a Texas
court. Once filed, the Texas court clerk must treat it as judgment of
that local court, subject to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a
judgment as a local judgment.93
(3) Jurisdiction and venue: The UEFJA does not address
personal jurisdiction and has no provisions for subject matter
90. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(1), (2), (4).
91. See Wolfram v. Wolfram, 165 S.W.3d 755, 759-60 & n.5 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2005, no pet.) (finding California abstract of judgment insufficient proof of
judgment).
92. Minor variations in exemplification forms, both in various Texas counties and
from other states, suggest that the language and procedure are largely determined on a
district-by-district basis.
93. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (echoing 28 U.S.C. § 1738); see
also Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Malone v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 858
S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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jurisdiction and venue, other than allowing an authenticated sister-
state judgment to be filed in "any court of competent jurisdiction of
this state."9 Subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied in any court
competent to enforce judgments, although judgment creditors will
want to be careful to file in a court whose amount-in-controversy
limits cover the judgment.
Personal jurisdiction in F-2 (Texas in this case) should not be an
issue, other than compliance with Shaffer v. Heitner's mandate that
abolished pure quasi in rem jurisdiction and requires all assertions of
personal jurisdiction to satisfy minimum contacts.95 Shaffer should not
be a problem in judgment enforcement because the issue is not the
merits of the claim now reduced to judgment but the susceptibility of
assets to execution-debtors should be amenable anywhere those
assets are located.
Venue, however, produces disagreement. The statutory
authorization to file the foreign judgment "in any court of competent
jurisdiction of this State" would seem to permit filing in any judicial
district. In Cantu v. Grossman, a Texas court of appeals found the
UEFJA to be subject to the Texas general venue statute and thus
reversed the trial court's rejection of the judgment debtor's venue
challenge, disagreeing with both a dissenting justice in that case and a
prior Texas appellate case."
As to all these points-subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and venue-this section addresses them only in F-2,
which is Texas in this case. As discussed elsewhere, problems with
jurisdiction and venue in F-1 are grounds for challenges in F-2 if the
issue was not litigated or waived in F-1.7
(4) Notice to the judgment debtor: Notice to the judgment debtor
is required but may be done by the court clerk or the judgment
creditor. Notice through the clerk is done by the judgment creditor's
filing an affidavit showing the judgment debtor's name and last known
post office address, and the judgment creditor's name and address,
and if represented by an attorney, that name and address. Notice
through the judgment creditor by mail to the judgment debtor is
accomplished with proof of mailing filed with the clerk. Although
94. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(a).
95. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-12 (1977).
96. Compare Cantu v. Grossman, 251 S.W.3d 731, 740-42 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet. h.), with Moncrief v. Harvey, No. 05-90-01116-CV, 1991 WL
258684, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 26, 1991, no writ). The Cantu majority opinion
cites supporting opinions from three states. Cantu, 251 S.W.3d. at 738-39.
97. See supra notes 34 & 79 and accompanying text.
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either method will accomplish notice, prudent creditors will do both
to ensure enforcement.
9 s
(5) Fees: Under the UEFJA, the foreign-judgment filing fee is the
same as that for local lawsuits, and other enforcement fees are the
same as for Texas judgments.99 Fees, of course, will vary from district
to district.
c. Defenses
The UEFJA does not address defenses but merely states that "[a]
filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating,
staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the court
in which it is filed."'' ° The emphasized language is misleading because
full faith and credit requires that F-1 law control the effect of the
judgment in F-2.' Thus, although F-2 law will govern the form for
raising defenses, the F-1 law and the Constitution govern the
substance of those defenses. In spite of the UEFJA's non-mention of
specific defenses, it is clear that full faith and credit defenses are
implied.'"
98. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.004-.005.
99. See id. § 35.007.
100. Id. § 35.003(c) (emphasis added).
101. F-2 law governs the procedural mechanism for raising objections. See id.;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 & cmt. a (1971). But any real
attacks on the judgment must come from full-faith-and-credit case law, in combination
with F-1 law. For example, if the judgment debtor wishes to defeat the judgment by
challenging his personal jurisdiction in F-i, that objection will be determined by F-1 service
of process law and long arm statutes, along with the due process standards of minimum
contacts; this was true for common law enforcement, see Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62
(1938) (reversing a Texas judgment), and remains true under the UEFJA. See Markham v.
Diversified Land & Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998,
pet. denied); Mayfield v. Dean Witter Fin. Servs., Inc., 894 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1995, writ denied); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§
96-97 (personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction; respectively). Objections that
were litigated or waived in F-1 ordinarily may not be raised again in F-2. See, e.g., Firstar
Bank Milwaukee, NA v. Cole, 678 N.E.2d 668, 670-71 (111. App. Ct. 1997); Merritt v.
Harless, 685 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ). On the other hand, a
debtor challenging a default judgment may object to F-1 jurisdiction but not to the F-1
judgment's merits. The debtor may also object to the F-2 court's venue or jurisdiction and
that will be resolved under F-2 law. It is unlikely, however, that jurisdiction will be an
issue-the court will have sufficient personal jurisdiction if the debtors have executable
assets in the forum, and subject matter will not be a problem if the enforcement action is
filed in a court of general jurisdiction or in a county court at law with adequate amount-in-
controversy coverage for the judgment.
102. See Schwartz v. F.M.I. Props. Corp., 714 S.W.2d 97, 99-100 (Tex. App.-Houston




Upon filing in Texas, the F-1 judgment becomes a Texas
judgment, 3 immediately enforceable but subject to post-judgment
motions based on the full faith and credit objections listed above.'O° A
motion for new trial is the appropriate remedy,"' and once made, the
trial judge is required to stay enforcement for an "appropriate
period."' ' Failure to make timely objections results in an immediately
enforceable judgment.'" Stays are the only express means under the
UEFJA for raising objections in the trial court, although the statute
retains other F-2 judgment objections."
(1) Stays: The UEFJA provides three grounds for stay of
judgment enforcement in F-2. The first is an F-1 appeal, that is, the
judgment creditor may show that an appeal is pending or will be
taken, or that the time for perfecting appeal has not expired.1° The
second is an F-1 supersedeas bond-the judgment creditor may show
that a stay of execution has been granted, has been requested, or will
be requested and that security under F-1 law has been furnished or
will be furnished."' The third is any grounds for stay under F-2 law,
which in Texas would include a supersedeas bond."1 The UEFJA
statutory language does not impose a time limit on the availability of
stays, although waiting longer than thirty days risks execution.
(2) Other trial court objections: As noted above, the UEFJA
retains the judgment debtor's right to make objections to judgment
enforcement in F-2 that do not otherwise violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause."2 The availability of these motions can be misleading-
103. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c) (echoing 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2006)); see also Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (stating that Texas is required, under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to enforce a valid judgment from another state); Malone
v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 858 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ
denied).
104. See supra Part.I.A.2.a.
105. See Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 483.
106. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.006(b).
107. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702,
714-15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
108. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c).
109. Id. § 35.006(a).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 35.006(b). For Texas supersedeas requirements, see TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006. See also EnviroPower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 265
S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (en banc) (vacating trial
court's order on supersedeas bond and remanding for recalculation).
112. E.g., Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., v. Wen Lung Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285-86 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam); Trinity Capital Corp. v. Briones, 847 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1993, no writ) (motion for new trial).
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unlike original Texas judgments, challenges to sister-state judgments
are limited to questions of proper filing and entitlement to full faith
and credit, with the result being enforcement or denial of
enforcement. New trials and other inquiries into the dispute's merits
are unavailable.13 Any such motions, including motions for stay, filed
within thirty days are treated as motions for new trial.
1 4
(3) Appeal: An appeal is routinely available for parties who
raised timely objections in the Texas trial court (that is, after the
UEFJA filing). Restricted appeal may be available under Rule 30 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure for parties failing to raise
timely trial court objections, if filed within six months of the initial
Texas UEFJA filing."5 A bill of review may also be available, again
limited to the issues of proper UEFJA filing and full faith and
credit.'16
d. Burdens and Presumptions
The initial burden is on the judgment creditor to present a
facially valid, authentic, and final judgment."7 Once that facially
appropriate document has been filed, notice given, and other UEFJA
procedures complied with, the judgment is presumed enforceable
unless the judgment debtor establishes a defense."' Specific
presumptions include authenticity,"9 validity,2 ° finality, 2' and that F-1
113. See Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied);
Markham v. Diversified Land & Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.-Austin
1998, pet. denied); Trinity Capital, 847 S.W.2d at 326-27.
114. See Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20,23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
115. See Mayfield v. Dean Witter Fin. Servs., 894 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, writ denied).
116. E.g., Markham, 973 S.W.2d at 439.
117. See H. Heller & Co. v. La.-Pac. Corp., 209 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Russo, 105 S.W.3d at 46.
118. See H. Heller & Co., 209 S.W.3d at 849; Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker
Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, pet.
denied); Fuhrer v. Rinyu, 647 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
119. See Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 782 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (stating that the lack of an F-1 judge's signature does not
otherwise defeat a properly authenticated copy of New York judgment and its
presentation in Texas shifts the burden to the judgment debtor to disprove its
authenticity).
120. See Trinity Capital Corp. v. Briones, 847 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso
1993, no writ) (stating the judgment debtor has the burden of proving the invalidity of a
sister-state judgment after the judgment creditor presents properly authenticated
judgment). This presumption applies even to F-1 default judgments, see First Nat'l Bank v.
Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); to F-1 default
judgments signed only by the court clerk and not a judge, see Minuteman, 782 S.W.2d at
342-43. See also Markham, 973 S.W.2d at 439 (explaining that in a sister-state's default
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law is identical to Texas law." Note that Texas courts must take
evidence of foreign law on judicial notice with the offering of
photocopies.'
2. Common Law Enforcement
The Texas UEFJA specifically preserves the common law
enforcement method.12' The judgment creditor must file a new action
in Texas and then may move for summary judgment using the sister-
state judgment for claim or issue preclusion. In spite of the extra
procedural steps, this method nonetheless benefits from the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and its statutory counterpart.1 25 The sister-state
judgment may be authenticated under the simplified federal
procedure provided in the statute. 2' The resulting judgment is
enforceable to the extent of any other Texas judgment, just as with
the UEFJA procedure.
The defenses to common law enforcement are based both on full
faith and credit and on claim preclusion (on which common law
judgment enforcement depends). In using the common law method
judgment, recitals of facts establishing defendant's personal jurisdiction in F-1 are
presumed valid and burden is on defendant to disprove them).
121. See Myers v. Ribble, 796 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ)
(stating the F-1 judgment's finality is presumed unless the judgment is facially
contradictory in which case burden is on judgment creditor to prove finality).
122. See Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 487
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (presuming Georgia law to be the
same as Texas law so that an interlocutory Georgia judgment could not be enforced there);
Stine v. Koga, 790 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd) (stating the
judgment creditor bears the burden of proving sister-state law, which is presumed to be the
same as that of Texas); see also Joannou v. Corsini, 543 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (concluding that because the judgment creditor failed to introduce evidence of F-1
law regarding finality, it was presumed identical to F-2 law).
123. See TEx. R. EVID. 202, quoted supra note 86. Texas law requires neither the
pleading of another state's law, see Wickware v. Session, 538 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); nor the production of certified originals or
photocopies, see Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384,
386 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). It does require that the party point
out with particularity, in a pleading or motion, the specifics of the other state's law. See
State Nat'l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 290 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990,
writ denied); Cal Growers, 687 S.W.2d at 386. For specifics on pleading and moving for
judicial notice, see Olin Guy Wellborn III, Judicial Notice Under Article II of the Texas
Rules of Evidence, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 26-27 (1987).
124. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2008); see, e.g.,
Brown's Inc. v. Modem Welding Co., 54 S.W.3d 450,453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.); Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1994, writ denied); First Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d at 103.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
126. See id.
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for sister-state judgment enforcement, the actions need not be
identical or against the same parties. Full faith and credit and the
resulting preclusion will apply only to parties and claims in the prior
action.127 In spite of the UEFJA's efficiency, common law
enforcement remains important. One example is a Texas lawsuit
based on, or following up, a sister-state action, where additional
parties are needed in the Texas suit.
C. Outbound Texas Judgments-Enforcing Texas Judgments in
Sister States
For the Texas attorney seeking to enforce a Texas judgment in
another jurisdiction in the United States, there are two possibilities-
the F-2 state will either be a UEFJA jurisdiction or it will not. In
either case, the full-faith-and-credit standards are the same. The only
difference will be the local procedures, and those differences should
be minor.
1. Enforcement in States Following the UEFJA
Many states have adopted the UEFJA and follow a similar or
identical procedure to that in Texas. In spite of this uniformity, take
care to check for minor statutory modifications before assessing
enforceability, and of course, seek local advice from local counsel in
F-1.I
2. Enforcement in Non-UEFJA States
In other States where the UEFJA procedure is not available,
Texas judgments are nonetheless enforceable under the common law
and the full faith and credit mandate, as explained above.129 The
procedure is to file a new lawsuit in F-2 and then move for summary
judgment based on preclusive effect of the Texas judgment and the
resulting full faith and credit mandate. Either in the initial filing or
with the summary judgment motion, the creditor must file an
authenticated copy of the Texas judgment. The authentication
requirements are stated in § 1738, but creditors should also verify
127. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 103-21 (1971
& Supp. 1989) (describing various defenses to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments).
128. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (amended 1964), 13 pt.
I U.L.A. 155-56 (2002).
129. See supra Part I.B.2.
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compliance with F-2 law. Although enforcing jurisdictions must heed
the authentication provisions of § 1738 (pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause), compliance with both will facilitate enforcement.
D. Federal Courts
The United States has not only collateral (sister-state and
territorial) jurisdictions but a hierarchical federal-state system as well.
This raises potentially difficult questions in a number of areas
including inter-jurisdictional judgment enforcement. Fortunately the
answers are straightforward and consistent as highlighted in three
broad categories.
Intra-federal enforcement, where F-1 and F-2 are both federal
courts, presents no cross-jurisdictional issues. Federal law provides for
registration of a final federal judgment in any district and entitles it to
the same status as in the adjudicating district.' Time limits are
established by the state law of the F-2 district.3
State and federal court mixes are treated as collateral
jurisdictions, with the federal court having no greater or lesser priority
to impose its rules. That is, where F-1 is a state court and F-2 is a
federal court, federal courts must give full faith and credit to state
court judgments. "2 Where F-1 is a federal court and F-2 is a state
court, the state court must give full faith and credit to the federal
court judgment.133 Because federal law has no judgment-enforcement
statute, federal courts may use the common law method or the local
state's uniform act.134
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
131. See Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Int'l Yachting Group, Inc., 252 F.3d 399, 406 (5th
Cir. 2001).
132. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323,
338, 347-48 (2005) (holding Fifth Amendment takings claims are not an exception to full
faith and credit for state actions in federal courts); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465-
66, 476, 485 (1982) (applying § 1738 preclusion to Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission claim, barring relitigation in federal court); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96
(1980).
133. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938); Thompson v. E. Tex. Ref. Co.,
97 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ).
134. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.001 (Vernon 2008) (applying the
Act to any court in the United States or any court whose judgments are entitled to full
faith and credit); see, e.g., Tenn. ex rel. Sizemore v. Sur. Bank, 200 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir.
2000).
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II. INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
This Part discusses international judgment enforcement, with a
brief general overview of the international rules (or lack of them), a
quick summary of various national laws, and then a detailed focus on
Texas practice for both inbound foreign-country judgments and
outbound Texas judgments. The discussion focuses on civil judgments,
particularly those involving monetary awards, with some discussion of
non-monetary judgments.
A. The International Mosaic
The global picture for international judgment enforcement can
be summarized in three basic points, discussed further below. First,
there is no international law mandate although there are several
treaties. Second, although the United States is not a signatory to any
judgment enforcement treaties for general civil judgments, it has
signed treaties covering arbitration and family matters, as well as a
treaty governing the authentication of foreign judgments. Third, in the
absence of international rules, the law of the country where
enforcement is sought (F-2) controls and those laws vary widely.
1. Treaties
Beginning in 1993, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law undertook a Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition of Judgments, but that project faltered for the
participants' inability to agree on key issues regarding jurisdiction.135
In the wake of the Hague Judgments Convention failure, in 2005 the
Hague Conference produced the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements which applies to litigation resulting from
consenting parties' choice of forum agreements and enforces the
resulting judgments, subject to exceptions.136 With an eye toward the
two Hague Judgments conventions, the American Law Institute
proposed a federal statute for foreign judgment enforcement.
135. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 580-82 (3d ed. 2006); WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, § 11.8; Ved P. Nanda, The
Landmark 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 773,
775-76 (2007).
136. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98; see also
Nanda, supra note 135. As of this writing, Mexico and the United States are the only
signatories. See Status Table, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
http://www.hcch.netlindex-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Feb. 18,2009).
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The United States recently became a signatory to the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, but the United States
has not acted on the ALI proposal 37 and is not a party to any other
treaty governing the enforcement of foreign-country judgments in
general civil matters. The United States is, however, a party to two
arbitration treaties,138 to the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction,'39 to the Hague Convention on Child Support, ' ° and to the
Apostille Convention governing the authentication of foreign-country
judgments . 4 The argument has been made that the United States'
many treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation provide some
enforcement basis beyond comity, although no cases were found
supporting this. For court judgments in civil litigation other than child
custody, the enforcing country's (F-2's) law is the primary and likely
exclusive means of enforcement, discussed below in terms of both
inbound and outbound judgments.
As for other nations, although there is no widely subscribed
treaty between other nations, several judgment enforcement treaties
do exist between blocks of countries such as the European Union.
142
137. See FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (2006),
reprinted in AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006); Status Table, supra
note 136.
138. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 4 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§
201-08 (2006)); see also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2006)).
139. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983).
140. Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and
Other Forms of Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=131. As of this writing, the
United States and Burkina Faso are the only signatories. See Status Table, Convention of
23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of
Family Maintenance, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=131
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
141. See infra note 162.
142. In 1971, the Hague Conference on Private International Law drafted its
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, 5 I.L.M. 636, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=78, but the only signatories
were Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal. See Status Table, Convention of 1 February
1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78 (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009). The European Union has two multilateral treaties for judgment
enforcement: the first is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2, available
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2. The United States View of Foreign-Country Judgments
In the absence of controlling international law and treaties, the
law of the enforcing jurisdiction (F-2) controls the enforcement of
foreign-country judgments. In countries with a bifurcated legal
system, logic suggests that national law-as opposed to state or
provincial law-controls the country's recognition and enforcement of
judgments from other countries. This is not true in the United States.
When the Supreme Court clarified United States law on this issue
in 1915, its decision was "overruled" by a series of state court cases
rejecting its premise that federal law governed foreign country
judgment enforcement. Specifically, Hilton v. Guyot held that a
French judgment was unenforceable under United States federal
common law because of a lack of reciprocity from French courts. 143 In
spite of Hilton's ruling that federal law controlled the issue, state
courts quickly broke away, and today, the standard is to apply state
law-even in federal courts-to foreign country judgments. Hilton
nonetheless was important for endorsing reciprocity, citing comity as
the standard, and providing a federal common law basis for foreign
judgment enforcement.'"
The irony is that in the United States, interstate judgments are
controlled by a unified national law-the Full Faith and Credit
at http://archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de/convention-bruxelles/en/c-textesfbrux-idx.htm, (among
European Union member states); the second is the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16. 1988, 1988
O.J. (L 319) 9, available at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-
textes/lug-idx.htm, (among European Union, Poland, and EFTA members Iceland,
Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). This is now covered by a European Union
regulation. See Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
143. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895). Assessing the acceptability of foreign
country judgments, Hilton pointed out three possibilities: (1) a F-2 plaintiff sues an F-1
defendant in F-i-the judgment should be enforced universally no matter who wins
because the plaintiff chose the forum; (2) an F-1 plaintiff sues an F-2 defendant and the F-2
defendant wins-the judgment should also be enforced universally because the defendant
foreign to that forum won; and (3) an F-1 plaintiff sues an F-2 defendant and the F-1
plaintiff wins, raising a possibility of fraud or unfairness and calling for review prior to
enforcement. Id. at 170-71.
144. New York courts were the first to reject Hilton, heeding the Hilton four-justice
dissent and opting for res judicata as the basis of enforcement rather than comity and
making a clear statement for state law controlling foreign country judgments between
private parties. See Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1005
(5th Cir. 1990); Somportex Ltd. v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971); Johnston v. Compagnie G~ndrale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y.
1926); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 N.Y.S. 284, 287 (N.Y. App. Div.),
affd, 159 N.E. 669 (N.Y. 1927); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. a (1987).
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Clause-while international judgments are controlled by local law
which varies from state to state. Some uniformity is achieved in the
twenty-nine states and two territories currently using some version of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,145 and other
states find similar uniformity in the rules of claim preclusion, but it
remains true that international enforcement is far less uniform than
interstate enforcement.
With state law controlling foreign country judgments in the
United States, there is nonetheless one overarching federal point-the
absence of full faith and credit. That is, even if federal law controlled,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to foreign country
judgments. '46 In spite of that, the uniform act adopted in Texas and
several other states provides that a qualified foreign-country money
judgment "is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister
state that is entitled to full faith and credit.
147
A summary of United States law on enforcing foreign country
judgments entails seemingly contradictory statements. State law
controls and there is no federal standard, but there is nonetheless a
somewhat uniform standard in the twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia, all following the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.' Full faith and credit does not apply to foreign
judgments, but it is analogized into the UFCMJRA's standards, and
even in states not following the UFCMJRA, foreign judgments enjoy
a presumption favoring enforcement under comity and claim
preclusion.
3. Foreign Judgment Enforcement in Other Countries
The limits of journal publishing do not allow for any detailed
analysis or summary of the wide variety of foreign-judgment practice
around the world. Moreover, any detailed discussion that seemed to
answer case-specific questions would be inappropriate for
145. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACr (1962), 13 pt. II
U.L.A. 39-80 (2002). A newer uniform act is available for foreign country money
judgments. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (amended
2005), 13 pt. II U.L.A. 5-20 (Supp. 2008). Texas has not adopted it.
146. Full Faith and Credit's limited application to jurisdictions within the United
States is obvious from the Clause's wording. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker
Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
denied); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, § 24.3.
147. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.004 (Vernon 2008).
148. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962), 13 pt. II
U.L.A. 39-80 (2002).
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practitioners. Enforcing Texas judgments in foreign countries requires
advice from local F-2 counsel, and there is no substitute for that.
Nonetheless, some observations are appropriate about foreign
practice, along with sources.
The classic English conflicts treatise, Cheshire and North,
provides the most complete of the readily available summaries of
English and European practice with foreign judgment enforcement,
with detail on English practice within the European Union and for
judgments from countries outside the Union, like the United States.4 9
American treatises also give valuable overviews and some detail.
Notably, Professor Weintraub's most recent conflict of laws treatise
has a thorough summary of foreign judgment enforcement practices in
common law jurisdictions, European countries, and China.5 Andreas
Lowenfeld, co-reporter on the American Law Institute's foreign-
judgments project, states that there is only one universal principle-
that no country will enforce a judgment from a forum that lacked
personal jurisdiction over the debtor, though standards of assessing
jurisdiction differ."' Other than that, requirements vary sufficiently
for Lowenfeld to label them collectively as "Obstacles to Recognition:
57 Varieties" including differing views on reciprocity, default
judgments, and refusing to enforce judgments against F-2 nationals or
domiciliaries. 1
52
As noted above, treaties among groups of countries-notably
economic unions-provide an exception to these varied practices and
create an enforcement standard somewhat akin to full faith and credit
in the United States.15 Apart from the treaty practice and a few
common enforcement threads, there are too many differences among
countries to detail here. As discussed below, these numerous
149. See PETER NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 10 & 11 (13th ed. 1999).
150. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, § 11.8; see also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING 254-74
(4th ed. 2003) (discussing various aspects of enforcing United States judgments in other
countries).
151. See LOWENFELD, supra note 135, at 531. The Scoles treatise compares the
English and Canadian practice to the American common law model of requiring a new
lawsuit using the foreign judgment as a basis for summary resolution, contrasted with the
civil law model of giving the foreign judgment exequatur, or executory force, somewhat
like the Uniform Act approach in the United States. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, §
24.38, at 1315-18. As to the exequatur procedure, see also WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, at
758 n.129.
152. See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 135, at 530-49.
153. See supra Part II.A.1; see also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, § 24.38, at 1319-20;
LOWENFELD, supra note 135, at 550-80.
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differences in other countries' foreign-judgment practice require an
awareness at the outset of F-1 litigation regarding the likely place of
enforcement."5
B. Inbound Foreign-Country Judgments in Texas Courts
As with interstate judgment enforcement, Texas permits two
methods of international judgment enforcement-common law and a
uniform statute.
1. The Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment
Recognition Act
The Texas UFCMJRA applies to judgments from foreign
countries granting or denying a sum of money, and does not apply to
judgments for taxes, fines, penalties, alimony, or child support. "5 A
foreign country is a governmental unit other than the United States,
its states and other possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, or the
Pacific Islands Trust Territory.156
The judgment must be final, conclusive, and enforceable in the
rendering country, even though it may be on appeal. It may be in
favor of either plaintiff or defendant, who would presumably raise it
in defense of an action here. 57 If the F-1 judgment has "facial finality,"
it is presumed final and the burden is on the F-2 judgment creditor to
produce evidence defeating finality. If the judgment lacks facial
finality, the burden remains with the F-2 judgment creditor to prove
finality."'The F-1 country's law controls finality.9
The Texas UFCMJRA resembles the UEFJA in several respects
noted below. Both are simplified filing procedures that avoid a second
lawsuit, although the UFCMJRA could lead to protracted litigation
under its greater number of defenses.
a. Enforcement Mandate
The UFCMJRA lacks the Constitution's full-faith-and-credit
mandate but imposes a statutory one, which provides that a properly
154. See infra Part II.B.
155. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001(2) (Vernon 2008).
156. Id. § 36.001(1).
157. See id. § 36.002; Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 336
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
158. Hernandez, 54 S.W.3d at 337 (citing Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.)).
159. Id.
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authenticated and filed judgment, with notice and other UFCMJRA
requirements fulfilled, and recognition not refused under section
36.005, is entitled to enforcement "in the same manner as a judgment
of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit." ' 6° Note that this
does not apply full faith and credit to foreign country judgments but
merely equates them once they have cleared the greater hurdles
under UFCMJRA section 36.005.
b. Authentication
The UFCMJRA requires that the foreign country judgment be
authenticated "in accordance with an act of congress, a statute of this
state, or a treaty or other international convention.' 6 ' This language
would seem to give three alternatives, but a United States treaty-the
Apostille Convention 62--creates the maximum requirement, although
parties may use federal or Texas law if the authentication requirement
is less stringent than the Convention's.1
3
The Apostille Convention provides for proof of official public
documents (such as court judgments) by a certification provision
known as an apostille.' 6' If the F-2 jurisdiction is a party to the
160. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.004.
161. Id. § 36.0041.
162. Hague Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign
Public Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 883, 527 U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Apostille
Convention]; see also Hague Conference on Private International Law,
http://www.hcch.net/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). Hague Conference signatories to this
convention include Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China (Hong Kong special administrative region), China (Macao
special administrative region), Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador,
Estonia, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. Status Table, Convention of 5 October
1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.phpact=conventions.statusprint&cid=41 (last visited Feb.
19, 2009). Non-members of the Hague Conference who are signatories include Andorra,
Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana,
Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cook Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malawi,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Republic of Moldova, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and
Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu. Id.
163. See Apostille Convention, supra note 162, at arts. 2-3.
164. The Convention creates a presumption of authenticity by limiting authentication
requirements (as to signature, capacity, and the identity of the seal or stamp which it
bears) to a seal issued by a competent authority from the F-i country, placed on the
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Apostille Convention, this means must be used, although other means
of authentication may be added to encourage acceptance in courts
unfamiliar with the apostille method. Other than the Apostille
Convention, no federal law applies to state court enforcement of
foreign country cases.
If enforcement is being done in a Texas state court and from an
F-1 country not party to the Apostille Convention, authentication
must be done under Texas Rule of Evidence 902(3) governing self-
authentication of foreign documents.' Federal Rule of Evidence
902(3), identical to the Texas Rule, provides for self-authentication of
foreign documents in federal courts. 66
To the extent Texas or federal law applies (rather than the
Apostille Convention), the specifics of authentication may be vague.
Judgment creditors can avoid vagueness by using exemplification, a
process of triple certification explained in Part I of this Article.67 In
addition-and this is supported not by legal authority but
experience-gold seals provide an aura of authenticity. Whether
authentication is governed by the Apostille Convention or strictly by
document itself or on an "allonge," modeled on the form attached to the Convention, and
drawn either in French or the language of the F-1 country. See id. at arts. 3-4.
165. TEX. R. EVID. 902(3).
A document purporting to be executed or attested in an official capacity by
a person, authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution
or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness
of the signature and official position (A) of the executing or attesting
person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of
signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a
chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating
to the execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of
the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If
reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the
authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good
cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without
final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary
with or without final certification. The final certification shall be dispensed
with whenever both the United States and the foreign country in which the
official record is located are parties to a treaty or convention that abolishes
or displaces such requirement, in which case the record and the attestation
shall be certified by the means provided in the treaty or convention.
Id.
166. FED. R. EVID. 902(3). Except for the Federal Rule's omission of the final
sentence, it is identical to TEX. R. EVID. 902(3).
167. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (stating that exemplification or "triple-
certification" is a widely-accepted form).
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F-2 law, it is a good idea to have the judgment both exemplified and
embossed.
c. Filing
Like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor
to file a copy of the authenticated foreign country judgment with
notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk'6s or the judgment
creditor. 69 Appropriate venue is the debtor's county of residence or
any other appropriate venue under Texas law. 7'
d. Jurisdiction and Venue
Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA has a venue rule, requiring
filing "in the county of residence of the party against whom
recognition is sought or in any other court of competent jurisdiction as
allowed under the Texas venue laws.'' Filing in a county or district
other than the judgment debtor's residence (or corporate location)
requires another venue basis under Texas law.1
72
Once venue is established, personal jurisdiction should not be an
issue other than compliance with Shaffer v. Heitner's mandate that
abolished pure quasi in rem jurisdiction and requires all assertions of
personal jurisdiction to satisfy minimum contacts.'73 Shaffer should not
be a problem in judgment enforcement because the issue is not the
merits of the claim now reduced to judgment but the susceptibility of
assets to execution-debtors should be amenable anywhere those
assets are located. Subject matter jurisdiction should be satisfied in
any court competent to enforce judgments.
e. Stays
The UFCMJRA provides for stays if the debtor shows that an
appeal is pending in F-1 or that time remains to perfect an appeal."'
f. Defenses
The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement or
sixty days if domiciled in a foreign country, with extensions up to
168. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.0042 (Vernon 2008).
169. Id. § 36.0043.
170. Id. § 36.0041.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 212 (1977).
174. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.007.
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twenty days or greater for good cause shown."5 The proper form is a
Motion for Nonrecognition with all supporting affidavits, briefs, and
other documentation.' The party opposing the motion, normally the
judgment creditor, has twenty days to respond after receipt of the
motion,' with a twenty-day or greater extension for good cause."8
The frontline defenses go to the Texas filing, which requires a
foreign-country judgment that is adequately authenticated, final, and
enforceable in the F-1 country.9 In addition to the threshold filing
requirement, the UFCMJRA (unlike the UEFJA) states ten explicit
grounds for non-recognition-three mandatory"' and seven
discretionary.' Mandatory nonrecognition grounds are directed to
the F-1 judgment's validity and include lack of a fair and impartial
tribunal (including lack of basic procedures or a biased tribunal);"
lack of personal jurisdiction in F-;' and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in the F-1 court." The seven discretionary grounds for
175. Id. § 36.0044(a), (d).
176. Id. § 36.0044(a)-(b).
177. Id. § 36.0044(c).
178. Id. § 36.0044(d).
179. Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001, no pet.); Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no
pet.). Requirements are discussed supra Part II.B.L.a-c of this Article.
180. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(a).
181. See id. § 36.005(b).
182. Id. § 36.005(a)(1); see also Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir.
1995) (failing to recognize Iranian default judgment on promissory notes because
defendant, who was Shah of Iran's sister, could not have appeared to defend herself after
the fundamentalist revolution); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), affd, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000). But the foreign procedures need not be
identical to those of the United States or Texas. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325,
330 (5th Cir. 2002) (accepting English procedures); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d
473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000) (accepting English procedures); Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d
1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that Iranian court conviction for murdering her
husband sufficient to deny Social Security survivor's benefits, despite due process
problems); Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
183. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(a)(2); see also Ma v. Cont'l Bank
N.A., 905 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1990). But see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
36.006; Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding F-1 personal jurisdiction valid if justified under F-1 or F-2 law, even if not
litigated on that basis in F-i). Although there is no case law illustrating this point, it should
be clear that a challenge in F-2 to the F-1 court's personal jurisdiction is limited to default
judgments and other instances where the F-2 judgment debtor neither litigated nor waived
objections on that issue.
184. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(a)(3). As with the challenge to
personal jurisdiction, see supra note 183, a challenge in F-2 to the F-1 court's subject
matter jurisdiction is limited to default judgments and other instances where the F-2
judgment debtor neither litigated nor waived objections on that issue.
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nonrecognition are inadequate notice in F-1;'85 fraud that was not and
could not have been litigated in F-1; 6 enforcing F-2's public policy;"8
contrary to another final judgment;'8 contrary to the parties'
agreement (e.g., a contrary forum selection clause or arbitration
agreement);'89 inconvenient forum in F-1; "' and lack of reciprocity.9
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations repeats these defenses
in order, except that lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a
185. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(1); see also Gondre v.
Silberstein, 744 F. Supp. 429,431 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
186. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(2); see also Fairchild,
Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (disallowing defense because issues could have been litigated in prior
English action). The fraud defense is difficult to satisfy-not one of the case annotations in
the model UFCMJRA allowed the defense. E.g., Fairchild, 470 F. Supp. at 615; Fiske,
Emery & Assocs. v. Ajello, 577 A.2d 1139, 1143 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989); Kam-Tech Sys.
Ltd. v. Yardeni, 774 A.2d 644, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Tonga Air Servs., Ltd.
v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 210-11 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); Bank of N.S. v. Tschabold Equip.
Ltd., 754 P.2d 1290, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
187. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(3). As one court has stated,
"the level of contravention of Texas law has 'to be high before recognition can be denied
on public policy grounds."' Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ram6n, 169 F.3d 317, 321, 323
(5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 900
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (mem.) (rejecting the judgment debtor's usury claim)); see also Soc'y of
Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting judgment-debtors'
argument that English judgments enforcing underwriters' obligations were contrary to
Texas public policy); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y.
Gen. Term 1992) (rejecting English libel judgment because enforcement would impose an
unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech). For a case relying on Texas public policy
to reject foreign judgments, see Soc'y of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643 (N.D.
Tex. 2001), affd sub nom. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002)
(judgment obtained through cognovits violated public policy).
188. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(4).
189. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(5); see also Courage Co. v.
Chemshare Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 334-35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)
(holding foreign judgment unenforceable because of breach of parties' agreement to
arbitrate). But see Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 304, 310 (N.D.
Tex. 1984) (mem.) (holding arbitration agreement not a defense where parties waited too
long and participated in other settlement negotiations over a seven-year period).
190. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(6); see also Dart v. Balaam,
953 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ) (observing defense but found
it inapplicable and honored Australian judgment).
191. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7); see also Banque
Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1990); Royal Bank
of Can. v. Trentham Corp., 665 F.2d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 1981). Note that reciprocity is a
discretionary ground for non-enforcement, and at least three Texas courts have rejected it
in specific cases. See Norkan Lodge Co. v. Gillum, 587 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (Canadian judgment); Hunt, 580 F. Supp. at 306 (English judgment); Reading &
Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (Canadian judgment).
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discretionary grounds for nonrecognition rather than mandatory, and
reciprocity is not a defense."
g. Full Faith and Credit for Foreign Country Judgment Denials
If a court in the United States denies enforcement under one of
the grounds above, that denial is entitled to full faith and credit in
other United States courts. 93 The declined foreign judgment may be
admissible as evidence for other purposes if the refusal was based on
conflict with public policy, conflict with another judgment, contrary to
the parties' forum clause, or for lack of reciprocity. If, however, the
foreign judgment was denied enforcement on grounds of jurisdiction,
fraud, or unfair judicial system, it may not be admitted for any
purpose."'
h. Burdens and Presumptions
Like the UEFJA, the initial burden is on the judgment creditor to
file a properly authenticated copy of the foreign judgment and
otherwise comply with the Act and Texas procedure; failure to
comply means no enforcement. 95 And like the UEFJA, once the
foreign country money judgment has been properly filed, it is
presumptively enforceable and the burden rests with the judgment
debtor to show grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement.'96
i. Proof of Foreign Law
Texas law provides for proof of foreign country law that: (1) the
party relying on the law of a foreign country shall give notice by
pleading or other reasonable written notice at least thirty days prior to
trial; (2) notice must include all written materials or sources to be
offered as proof of the foreign law; (3) if the foreign law's original text
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482(2) (1987).
193. See id. § 482 Reporters' Note 4.
194. See id. § 482 cmt. i.
195. See Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340, 344-45 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no
writ); Allen v. Tennant, 678 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ).
196. "[A] judgment 'that is not refused recognition is conclusive between the parties to
the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money."' Sw. Livestock & Trucking
Co. v. Ram6n, 169 F.3d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting the United States Magistrate
Judge from the lower court and citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.004
(West 1998)); see also Banque Libanaise, 915 F.2d at 1004; Hunt, 580 F. Supp. at 307;
Courage Co. v. Chemshare Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
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is not English, the party must provide both the original non-English
text and an English translation; (4) evidence of foreign law includes
affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and any other material source,
whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not admissible
under the Texas Rules of Evidence. If the court considers sources not
offered by a party, it must give reasonable notice, an opportunity to
comment on the sources, and an opportunity to submit further
materials; (5) the determination of foreign law is a question of law,
not fact.1'
j. Appeal
Appeal is routinely available for parties who raised timely
objections in the Texas trial court (that is, after the UFCMJRA
filing). Restricted appeal may be available for parties failing to raise
timely trial court objections if filed within six months of the initial
Texas UFCMJRA filing.9' A bill of review may also be available,
again limited to the issues of proper UEFJA filing and full faith and
credit. No Texas cases are available illustrating restricted appeal and
bill of review, but analogies may be made to Texas cases interpreting
the UEFJA.' 99
197.
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country shall give notice in the pleadings or other reasonable written notice,
and at least 30 days prior to the date of trial such party shall furnish all
parties copies of any written materials or sources that the party intends to
use as proof of the foreign law. If the materials or sources were originally
written in a language other than English, the party intending to rely upon
them shall furnish all parties both a copy of the foreign language text and an
English translation. The court, in determining the law of a foreign nation,
may consider any material or source, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the rules of evidence, including but not limited to
affidavits, testimony, briefs, and treatises. If the court considers sources
other than those submitted by a party, it shall give all parties notice and a
reasonable opportunity to comment on the sources and to submit further
materials for review by the court. The court, and not a jury, shall determine
the laws of foreign countries. The court's determination shall be subject to
review as a ruling on a question of law.
TEX. R. EVID. 203; see also Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 314
(Tex. 1987).
198. See TEX. R. APp. P. 30.
199. See Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wen Lung Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam); Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied);
Markham v. Diversified Land & Exploration Co., 973 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Austin




2. Common Law Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments
The Texas UFCMJRA allows for recognition "in a situation not
covered by this chapter" and impliedly reserves the common law
enforcement method." The common law procedure is the same as
that for sister-state judgments; that is, the judgment creditor files a
new lawsuit in Texas alleging the underlying wrong and pleading the
foreign judgment and then moves for summary judgment based on
preclusion. Without the mandate from full faith and credit, preclusion
takes on a somewhat more discretionary role, as illustrated by the
UFCMJRA's discretionary grounds for nonrecognition on points such
as lack of notice which are mandatory under full faith and credit and
the UEFJA.'O Comity is also a basis for enforcement, which allows for
discretionary enforcement along more vague guidelines than
preclusion, although presumably with similar safeguards.2°
3. Treaties
a. Treaties on Judgment Enforcement
The United States is not a signatory to any treaty governing the
enforcement of foreign civil judgments. If the United States were to
enter one, it would of course supplant state law. Beginning in 1993,
the Hague Conference on Private International Law undertook a
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments,
but that project faltered for the participants inability to agree on key
issues regarding jurisdiction. 3 In the wake of the Hague Judgments
Convention failure, in 2005 the Hague Conference produced the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements which applies to
litigation resulting from consenting parties' choice of forum
agreements and enforces the resulting judgments, subject to
exceptions.' With an eye toward the two Hague Judgments
conventions, the American Law Institute proposed a federal statute
for foreign judgment enforcement. 5 As of January 19, 2009, the
200. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (Vernon 2008).
201. See id. § 36.005.
202. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 212, 227 (1895) (recognizing comity as
discretionary ground for recognizing and enforcing foreign country judgments).
203. See LOWENFELD, supra note 135, at 580-84; Nanda, supra note 135, at 775-76.
204. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 136; see also
Nanda, supra note 135. As of this writing, Mexico and the United States are the only
signatories. See Status Table, supra note 136.
205. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 137.
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United States became a signatory to the Hague Convention on Choice
of Courts. Although the United States is not a party to any treaty
regarding enforcement of general civil judgments, and although there
is no widely subscribed treaty between other nations, several
judgment enforcement treaties do exist between blocks of countries
such as the European Union.'
b. Other Treaties Affecting Judgment Enforcement
Other treaties may have a bearing on judgment enforcement,
sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. An example of direct
application is the Apostille Convention, to which the United States
is a party even though it is not codified in the United States Code. The
Apostille Convention provides for proof of official public documents
(such as court judgments) by a certification provision known as an
apostille. In Texas, the certifying authority is the Secretary of State.
The United States is also a signatory to the arbitration treaties listed
in the subpart immediately below.
4. Foreign Arbitral Awards
a. Against Private Parties
Foreign arbitration awards against private parties may be
enforced in Texas under federal and state law. The Federal
Arbitration Act2 incorporates two treaties addressing arbitration
award enforcement. The first is the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,2°9
providing that foreign arbitration awards must be confirmed unless:
the parties to the agreement were incapacitated, or the
agreement to arbitrate is not valid under the law chosen by the
parties, or if no choice under the law of the country where the
award was made;
the party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the arbitrator's appointment; or proceedings, or
was otherwise unable to present its case;
206. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
207. Hague Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign
Public Documents, supra note 162.
208. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
209. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, supra note 138.
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the award deals with a difference [sic] not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions or matters beyond the scope of submission,
provided that the matters properly decided, if severable, may be
enforced;
the arbitral panel was not composed in accordance with the
arbitration agreement, or if none on point, not in accordance
with the law of the forum country;
the award is not yet binding, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the forum country.
2 10
The Federal Arbitration Act's second incorporated treaty is the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, in which Article V has nonenforcement grounds similar
to those of the U.N. Convention stated immediately above."'
For Texas state law enforcement, the Texas International
Arbitration Act governs.1 2 The Texas UFCMJRA does not mention
whether arbitration awards qualify as judgments and does not define
the scope of the term judgments other than to require a fair and
impartial tribunal and "procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law., 213 On the other hand, the Texas UFCMJRA
provides that arbitration agreements which were breached in favor of
foreign litigation may be a defense to the enforcement of a foreign
country judgment.214
b. Against Foreign Sovereigns
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act subjects foreign
sovereigns to the jurisdiction of federal and state courts for the
210. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (incorporating U.N. Convention art. V); see, e.g., Bridas
S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm. 345 F.3d 347,355 (5th Cir. 2003).
211. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 1,
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42,14 I.L.M. 336 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07).
212. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-.215 (Vernon 2005); see Bossley
v. Mariner Fin. Group, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000),
aff'd, 79 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002).
213. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(a)(1) (Vernon 2008). The
UFCMJRA defines foreign country judgment as a "judgment of a foreign country granting
or denying a sum of money other than a judgment for: (A) taxes, a fine, or other penalty;
or (B) support in a matrimonial or family matter," which also fails to clarify its application
to arbitral awards. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001(2).
214. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(5); see Hunt v. BP Exploration
Co. (Libya) Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 304, 310 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (mem.) (finding arbitration
agreement not a defense where parties waited too long and participated in other
settlement negotiations over a seven year period); Courage Co. v. Chemshare Corp., 93
S.W.3d 323, 332, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (failing to enforce
foreign judgment because of breach of parties' agreement to arbitrate).
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confirmation of an arbitral award,215 which is then enforceable under a
subsequent FSIA provision. 16
5. Federal Courts
The initial question for enforcing foreign country judgments in
federal courts is which law governs-federal or state? The answer is
that the local state's law generally governs, and this raises another
irony of federalism. The Supreme Court held in 1908 that federal law
governed foreign-country judgment enforcement in state courts.217 Not
only have the state courts collectively overruled this, but through the
Erie Doctrine, state law also applies in federal courts faced with
foreign country judgments. Thus, federal courts enforcing foreign
country judgments apply the local state's law,218 subject to exceptions
for (1) foreign arbitral awards against private parties (for which either
state or federal law may be applied) 219 and (2) as to foreign sovereigns,
both foreign arbitral awards22 and foreign court judgments.221
To the extent that foreign country law is an issue in judgment
enforcement, federal law controls, providing for the pleading and
215. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(6) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (2006); see, e.g., S & Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen,
218 F.3d 1292, 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000). But see Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm.,
345 F.3d 347, 365 (5th Cir. 2003) (adjudicating Argentine corporation's enforcement of
arbitration award against foreign government entirely under the Federal Arbitration Act
and without reference to subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
217. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,227-28 (1895).
218. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1006-
07 (5th Cir. 1990); Royal Bank of Can. v. Trentham Corp., 665 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir.
1981); Soc'y of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 2001), affd sub nom.
Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002); Norkan Lodge Co. v. Gillum, 587
F. Supp. 1457, 1459 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Hunt, 580 F. Supp. at 306.
219. Foreign arbitration awards may be enforced in Texas under either federal or state
law. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006); Texas International Arbitration
Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (Vernon 2005); see, e.g., Bridas
S.A.P.I.C., 345 F.3d at 353-54.
220. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act subjects foreign sovereigns to the
jurisdiction of federal and state courts for the confirmation of an arbitral award, which is
then enforceable under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (2006), and subject to the immunities stated
in 28 U.S.C. §8 1609-11 (2006). See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2006); Glenn W. Rhodes &
Lisa S. Buccino, International Litigation: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 36 INT'L
LAW. 449, 450 (2002).
221. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act also provides that all property of foreign
sovereigns is immune from judgment execution except as modified by treaty or under the
exceptions stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1610. Foreign sovereign property otherwise subject to
judgment execution may further be designated immune by the President. 28 U.S.C. § 1611.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2006).
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proof of foreign country law by pleadings or other reasonable written
notice. In determining the content, the court may consider testimony
or any other relevant material or source, whether or not submitted by
a party, and whether or not admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.222
6. Converting Foreign Monetary Judgments
Foreign country (F-i) judgments are presumably rendered in F-1
currency. There is no additional enforcement problem if the United
States F-2 judgment is rendered in the same currency, as done partly
in Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd.222
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations approves of United
States judgments in foreign currency, but some authorities question
224
an American court's ability to render judgments in foreign currency.
If enforcement in the United States requires conversion to U.S.
dollars, several problems arise including proof of U.S. equivalent
value. Testimony or other evidence supporting the proposed
conversion may be sufficient. More problematic is currency
fluctuations depending on the time of conversion. Currency
fluctuations present problems not only in proof of equivalent value in
United States dollars but in who bears the loss for fluctuations since
the judgment date. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
treats currency fluctuations as foreseeable consequential damages and
proposes that the judgment should be rendered in the foreign
currency only when conversion would have been proper at the date of
the F-1 judgment.225  In 1989, the Uniform Law Commissioners
drafted the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act which attempts both
to determine which country's currency applies and to guide the
conversion where necessary.226
222. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
223. 737 F.2d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1984).
224. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 823 & cmt. b (1987); see also PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 224-25 (12th ed. 2004).
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 823 cmt b. For additional material, see SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, § 24.40.
226. UNIF. FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS AcT (1989), 13 pt. II U.L.A. 13-38 (2002).
Twenty-three states, not including Texas, have adopted this Act. See 13 pt. II U.L.A. 2
(Supp. 2008).
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7. Non-Monetary Judgments
The Texas UFCJMRA is limited to money judgments.227 Foreign
country judgments awarding relief other than money may nonetheless
be enforceable in Texas courts under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Common law governs, requiring the filing of a new lawsuit in Texas
and a motion for summary judgment based on the preclusive effect of
the prior claim. Success may also depend on the category of the
228foreign judgment, as illustrated briefly in the following comments.
a. In Rem Judgments
(1) Real property judgments should never be necessary to
enforce. If the property is located in the rendering jurisdiction (F-i), it
will be enforced there. Conversely, courts generally lack jurisdiction
to adjudicate claims to real property outside the forum. Thus, any real
property judgment needing extraterritorial enforcement will be
invalid for lack of jurisdiction.229
(2) Personal property judgments from foreign courts may be
enforceable in Texas under claim preclusion, with special attention
paid to the F-1 court's jurisdiction over the property.2 °
b. Status Judgments
Judgments regarding divorce, child custody, and competence may
also be enforceable under claim preclusion, although public policy will
more often be a factor here. Texas has also enacted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 231 Foreign child
custody decrees may also be entitled to enforcement under federal
law, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,232 which is the
227. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001(2) (Vernon 2008).
228. For other non-money judgments from foreign countries, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 Reporters'
Note 2 (1987).
229. Citations are unnecessary for this tautology, but an interesting example is San
Lorenzo Title & Improvement Co. v. City Mortgage Co., 73 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Tex.
1934), holding that a prior Mexican judgment regarding land thought to be in Mexico was
invalid because a treaty ceded it to the United States.
230. See, e.g., United Coops. of Ont. v. MIV Good Trader, 622 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D.
La. 1985) (enforcing Canadian in rem judgment in maritime claim attaching boat). But see
Fuentes v. Sea-Land Servs. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 206, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying
enforcement of Guatemalan judgment regarding coffee for lack of jurisdiction over res).
231. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.101-.317 (Vernon 2008) (authorizing the
enforcement of both sister-state and foreign country child custody decrees); see, e.g., In re
Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d 899, 902-03 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-10 (2000).
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Congressional enactment of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction.23
c. Injunctions
Foreign injunctions are less likely to be enforced, but the doctrine
of comity provides discretion to do so.'
C. Enforcing Texas Judgments in Other Countries
This topic cannot be covered in a long article, let alone a short
one. The requirements of foreign countries vary significantly, linked
perhaps by a common suspicion of United States judgments which will
likely be rejected if the F-2 country's rules differ on jurisdiction,
discovery, or damages. This suggests that if the foreign country is the
only place where executable assets are located, you should structure
the Texas litigation and judgment to fit the foreign law and policy, if
possible.235
When enforcing Texas judgments abroad, three primary points
can be made. First, there is no customary international law that
controls the enforcement of judgments or arbitration awards. 36
Second, the applicable treaties are limited. The United States does
not participate in any judgment enforcement treaties or conventions
relating to commercial and tort judgments, although it does
participate in one child custody convention and two arbitration
conventions. Third, the enforcing country's law controls. In the
absence of a treaty, the enforcing country's (F-2's) law will control;
Texas or United States law will apply only to the extent that F-2 law
defers to F-1 law. For this reason, the Texas litigation should be
pursued with an eye toward F-2 law, if possible. This includes the
hiring of local counsel in F-2, preferably at the outset of the initial
lawsuit with an eye toward eventual enforcement.
233. Oct. 24, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
234. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
933-34 & n.84 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Thus, a court may honor a foreign injunction, see
Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1961); but may on the
other hand decline, see Laker, 731 F.2d at 955; Doyle v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 55 F.2d 708, 710
(D. Minn. 1932).
235. For summaries of various judgment enforcement rules from other countries, see
sources cited supra notes 149-54. See especially WEINTRAUB, supra note 150, at ch. 3.
236. See supra Part II.A.1.
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1. Examine Domestic Enforcement Opportunities
Although plaintiffs should plan for the foreign enforcement from
the outset of the litigation, 7 domestic enforcement options within the
United States offer a greater likelihood of collection. Once the
dispute is reduced to judgment, you may seize related and unrelated
assets wherever located within the United States. Specifically, Texas-
based assets may be pursued under Texas judgment enforcement
remedies, and assets in other states or territories within the United
States may be pursued under full faith and credit using the UEFJA or
common law. 3 8 If there are no domestic assets, foreign enforcement
may be examined. In approaching this, keep in mind that foreign
governments as judgment debtors may have additional immunities
and require additional procedures.f9
2. Enforcing Court Judgments Abroad
As noted above, customary international law does not address
judgment enforcement, and currently, the United States is not a party
to any treaty regarding foreign judgments in commercial or tort cases.
The United States is a party, however, to two arbitration treaties
(discussed below) and to the Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction.240 For judgments in other civil litigation, then, the
enforcing country's (F-2's) law is the primary and likely exclusive
means of enforcing a Texas state or federal judgment abroad.
Although the laws of all possible F-2 jurisdictions cannot be
summarized, the following suggestions will enhance enforcement. 4'1
a. Prerequisites-Planning for Enforcement in F-2
Plan for the enforcement at the outset of the Texas litigation.
Acquire an understanding of F-2 law with the help of an F-2 attorney.
Style the remedies in the Texas case in a way that will perhaps comply
with F-2 law and at worst not violate F-2's public policy. In particular,
plan your award of damages in accordance with F-2 law, which may
mean avoiding punitive damages. On the other hand, because you are
237. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
238. See supra Part I passim.
239. See supra note 152 (noting immunities for F-2 nationals and domiciliaries).
240. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
supra note 139.
241. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 481 Reporters' Note 6 (1987) (providing short summaries of
judgment enforcement practices in Great Britain, Canada, France, and Germany).
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only entitled to one judgment in the case (unless you commit fraud),
you may need to include punitive and other damages if there is any
possibility of enforcement in the United States.
b. Requisites-Preparing the Texas Judgment
The Texas (F-i) judgment should establish the same criteria as in
the other settings, again with special emphasis on indicia of reliability
and avoidance of F-2's public policy objections. This should be done
either facially on the judgment or in a supporting affidavit from a
lawyer licensed in F-1. The necessary criteria are:
(1) Validity: This includes the F-1 court's subject matter
jurisdiction, venue, and personal jurisdiction (always include a
recitation of proper service and, if necessary, non-resident
amenability).
(2) Finality: The F-1 judgment should (a) be entitled "Final
Judgment"; (b) quantify the damages with no equivocal or conditional
language regarding finality or damages; and (c) distinguish in separate
paragraphs any future or conditional damages. To the extent finality
must be proven in F-2, the judgment creditor should be prepared to
prove the content of Texas law and its application to the judgment.2
(3) Authentication: Once the Texas judgment is in proper form, it
must be authenticated by the Texas state or federal court in a manner
that will satisfy F-2 law. There are three possibilities-the Apostille
Convention if the F-2 country is a signatory;243 the use of F-2
authentication law where F-2 is not a party to the Apostille
Convention;2" and exemplification under Texas law as a stop-gap,
although this may not satisfy F-2 law.2"5
Other important points are the inclusion of a writ of execution
and gold seals and ribbons. It is difficult to speculate whether a Texas
execution order would be received in F-2 as evidence of the
judgment's finality and enforceability in F-i, but it cannot hurt. For
facial validity, gold seals and ribbons are still important and are
242. This is best proved by an expert's affidavit, with the expert being a licensed Texas
attorney other than the judgment creditor's attorney.
243. See supra note 162.
244. The F-2 jurisdiction will defer to Texas law only if F-2's choice of law rule calls
for F-1 law for authentication. Be sure to check with the F-2 local counsel in advance
because whatever F-2 requires, it will probably be accomplished in Texas.
245. Texas law calls for proof of official records by exemplification, commonly called
"triple certification." Whether authentication is governed by the Apostille Convention or
strictly by F-2 law, it is a good idea to have the judgment exemplified for the aura of
authenticity.
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available through the Texas exemplification process. Although their
presence does not assure reliability, their absence raises questions.
c. Filing and Notice
Filing and notice will of course be done under F-2 law, and of
course by an F-2 lawyer. In the best of circumstances, the F-2 lawyer
will have been consulted before the Texas trial.
d. Miscellaneous Requirements
F-2 law may have other requirements, such as a power of
attorney authorizing the F-2 attorney to represent the absent client
who will likely not appear in F-2.
e. Defenses
To avoid challenges in F-2, make sure the Texas judgment
reflects the Texas court's subject matter jurisdiction. Go even further
for personal jurisdiction-although the foreign court may defer to
Texas law on subject matter jurisdiction, it may impose its own
standards for personal jurisdiction. The Texas judgment should
support personal jurisdiction both factually and legally, and both as to
notice and amenability. To overcome the foreign country's imposition
of its own amenability and notice standards, the Texas judgment
should support personal jurisdiction under F-2 standards.
Going to the merits, the Texas judgment should also have
language justifying the law applied in the Texas adjudication; avoid
having the court simply default into the application of Texas or some
other United States law. For default judgments, do a thorough prove-
up, which of course is true even for domestic enforcement. To avoid
identity defenses in F-2, clearly identify the Texas defendant as the
judgment debtor in F-2, avoiding personal or entity ambiguities.
Except for default judgments in F-1 (Texas), most of these
defenses will be waived if the judgment debtor did not raise them in
Texas. But foreign jurisprudence may be more invasive of F-1 power
than enforcement within the United States.
Public policy is also a concern, and those objections may be
raised for the first time in the foreign country. Unlike enforcement
within the United States, foreign countries may reject judgments from
the United States that deviate from their own law. If possible,
structure the Texas judgment-both remedy and damages-to
coincide with the foreign country's law as far as possible.
[Vol. 50:399446
ENFORCING JUDGMENTS
Because planning ahead can maximize collection possibilities, it is
a good idea at the outset of international litigation to obtain foreign
counsel in the country where collection or enforcement is likely. The
foreign counsel can assist not only in planning for collection, but in
structuring the Texas judgment to comply as far as possible with the
F-2 law.
3. Enforcing Arbitration Awards
The United States is signatory to two arbitration treaties
providing for enforcement of American arbitral decisions in other
countries." In the absence of a treaty, arbitration awards are of
course subject to the F-2 country's local law. Although arbitrations
are customarily less formalistic than litigation, enforcement
possibilities will be enhanced if the arbitration record establishes the
elements listed above for court judgments.
246. See supra note 138.
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